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The Basic Yield Concept
mEbasic yield Conceptwas originally developed by the Corporate
Bond Project'to l)ro\'icIe a needed standard ofcomparison for the an-
alysis of corporatc bondyields. 1'he yiekl ofany bond is ordinarily
affected both by its qualityand its termto maturity, and one of the
problems faced by the Projectwas that of ascertaining what portion of
the yield is due toone or the other of these factors. A possiblesolution
was to compare the yield ofany bond with a standard yield representing
the highest grade obligationsoJ the same maturity. Todetermine this
standard yield a careful analysiswas made of the highest gradecorporate
bonds outstanding in the firstquarter of each year, and a series of basic
yield curves was derivedto measurc the yields and ternis to maturityof
these bonds. Therefore, in additionto Se1'Ving as a standard of compari-
son, these basic yield curves have contributedto our knowledge of the
relation between yield and maturityin the corporate market. Although
the curves themselvesattempt to measure the relationship betweenyield
and maturity at a givenimioment of time, they have enabledus to con-
struct series showing the yearly changes in yieldsfor the highest-grade
bonds of any specified maturityand to point out shifts in this yield-
maturity relationship.
These year-to-yearmovements of tile basic yields, it has beenob-
served, are somewhat less subjectto fluctuations than most series of
bond yields. On the whole, high gradebond yields aredistinctlyless
1 The zinalysis of basic yields was originally developedtindet the Coiporate Bond J'l(9e(-,.a Work
l'tjectsAdininistitioii Iili(lCitakitig sJ)onsorcd 1w (lie Fedei-atDepusit Iiisui-aiicCoipniatioii alit!
supervlsc(l In the National Bureau of Eoiiomic Researchwith the (mIj)eration of several public
agencies auth private investment services.
The most urgent iiccd lot- basic ',iCI(lS(>1 cliii citIII(1)11 nell 100 wit hithe ilieasl,l enlciiof
''market i at iilgs'' 01 htontls an eascut (a! part iii (lie Periodicand Annual st uilics iii (lie Coipoiatc
Bond Piujet t. Iiistiiuciioiis for the coiiuhu(ttai in,, of iu,arkctriitiilgs were developed In W. Brathiouk
Ilicknian .,uid ale i eptothticed iiihis Tin' Periodic. Annual andIon1h1r I?eco,dc o[ Corporate
Bond Es/n-cit-itt e, 1900-10: Tue Corporate Bond Projert,Organization andh'tiiods, Part1'
(National Buu call of Eclilnumi( Research, FinancialResearchPiogia ii,. insl)eu',uil icr 19 l2 Ap
pcndix C. p. 1-17. mneniorand tim of iuiit ructions tiatetiMay ii. hi II - Fm ii detailed ciat c,ne,It of the
echiuuiqucs tuscit in selecting the basic yields and fii,d isr,issionc of t lie toui(Cpt ccc l)avid 1)t,ra,uil
Basic }'ield.s of Corporate Bands, 1900.1912 (Natio,iaIIlmiteauu of Etti,iiiii Rt",earthulet hi,uit-al Paper ,rune 1912) and W. Braddoik Hickman. The TermStructure of tutg';e'c(flaI,'c.'in Fe-
/thnaloiv Ai,nly-jjc (Natictital Iltittait iii Fciuuoii,jt-Resi':irthu, nis. \tuvcuiuh,er lii,I 912)sensitive to'arjatjoiis in )WSS confidence than low grade bond
yields. Although yields of all gradesof bonds arc essential to a C0I1i})rC-
hensive of the money markets, basic yields are Particularly uSC-
lu! whenever itis desirable to minimize the effects ofvariations in
quality and risk. For example, the substantialdecline in Corporate l)Ofld
yields that occurred from about1 940 to i 946 did not represent a cledine
in interest rates so much asa rise in average bond (1uality and an in-
crease in general business confidence. Asa result o wartime prosperity,
the credfjositions of many obligors improved greatly,interest pay-
mnents were resumed on clef aulted bonds,and middle grade issues often
attained the status ofmoney bonds. Consequently, the changes in yields
of the various grades ofbonds in the marketwere far from uniform.
While most of the lowergrade issues were declining rapidly in yield,
the highest grades,as measured by the basic yield, were almostun-
affected.
At the turn of thecentury the corporate bond market occupied such
a dominant position in American financethat the student of long- and
medium-terminterest rates would necessarilyhave devoted most, if not
all, of his energiesto the measurement ofcorporate bond yields. And
he might even have restrictedhis attention to railroad bonds,the most
important single class of securitieswithin the Corporate market. His
task, furthermore,was made fairly easy by the general characteristicsof
the market. Since itwas the dominant market, volumewas large and
trading was well organized, andquotations were systematically recorded
nd easily obtained. Althoughbonds varied considerably in quality,
there was an adequaterepresentation of the higher grades,which could
be fairly readily identified- a process that became even easiera few
years later with the advent of Moody's ratings.Bonds also varied in
maturity, from a monthor so to a hundred years, and occasionally
longer, but this widerange posed no serious problems of analysisbe-
cause of the insignificant variation in yield withterm to maturity. For
1900 and several years after, almostany simple average of highgrade
bond yields, was sufficientto measure long- and medium-term interest
rates with reasonable precision.
SinceI 900 the picture has radically changed,and the Americami
money markets have become far more complex.Within thecorporate
market, railroad bonds have lost theirformer doniiiiant position,as
utility and industrial bonds havebecome more prominent.The call
feature seems to have increased inimportance; at the present time vir-
tually all corporate bonds issuedare callable at a small premium, high
grade bonds frequently sell above call price,and the exercise of the call
provision is a commonoccurrence. Finally, the corporate bondmarket,
like all other bond markets, hascome to differentiate between long-and shori-terin l)onds so that a single series of average yields is inade-
quate to describe the entire market.
But the most revolutionary developments have occurred outside the
corporate bond market. These include (i) the rise of the federal debt in
World \'Var I;(2)the rise in state and municipal debt in the decade
following World War I; () the rise in income tax rates, which has put
tax-exempt securities in a preferred position; and () the phenomenal
rise in the federal debt during the great depression and World War II,
which brought the United States government bond market to a position
of pre-eminence. Unlike1900,when the bond market was almost exclu-
sively a corporate market, there are today at least three important bond
markets, each having its own distinctive characteristics. Therefore, the
student of interest rates today needs several series of high grade bond
yields. He needs one series for tax-exempt state and municipal bonds,
he needs another for the taxable corporates, and he may riced two or
three for Treasury bonds, which are now differentiated by tax pro-
visions,eligibility for bank investment, and other considerations.
Furthermore, in each of these three markets yields vary appreciably
with term to maturil:y, and a completely satisfactory series must there-
fore include yields for several different maturities.
The purpose of the present study is to present a detailed description
of the basic yields for corporate, municipal, and Treasury bonds in the
first quarter of each year from ito 1947, to compare the three yield
structures, and to examine changes in the pattern of yields from year to
year.2 A less detaile(l analysis of the pattern ol basic yields from i 926 to
for selected maturities in the three principal sectors of the bond
market is also presented. This stud supplements and brings to date the
study of basic corporate bond yields.1900-I q42.published by the Na-
tional Bureau ini942,ain which 1)asic corporate bond yields were pre-
seined for the first quarter of each year of the period analvied and some
comparison was made between these yields and Ircasurv1)011(1','iel(IS.
The Definition 01 Basic Yields
.-\s indicated above, the basic yield is defined as the yield of the highest
grade bonds ofgiven mat urity free from xtraneous influences.4 Since
the moSt practical (1] tenon of quality for this analysis was current
mnai-ket appraisal, bon(ls with the lowest market yieI(ls were ordinarily
assumed to be those of the highest quality. OF course, the analysis was
rcstricte(l to bon(IS with high quality ratings, audi a considerable effort
2The expression "pat telti ol yields''isUSed ((I sighI y (lie(illetI 1(111 iiil)asicSIifU FVU, (!CS(iiI,
highgrade bond yields in the various seglilen ts of the bondata iket at a poi litof little.
SDavid Durand, op. cii.
4Ibid., p. 4.
3was made to eliminate all bonds with lowyields that may have been
attributed to the operation ofsome special feature, such as aConverSion
privilege or an activeprogram of debt rctircmcnt, 1 lowever,no attempt
was macic to justify quality by subsequentmarket performance. Prac-
tically speaking then, the basicyield is the lowest limit of yieldsÜCIUa1/y
attained in the market by highgrade bonds of a given maturity (111(1a
given class. While theyields of a number of bonds approachthe basic
yield, the yields of onlya few actually reach it.
The problem of relatingyield to maturity ismet by constructing
continuous yield-maturitycurves depicting the yields of the highest
grade bonds of all maturitiesfrom the shortest to the longest.Perhaps
the most widelyused yield-maturity curvesare those published cur-
rently by the Treasuryl)epartment.a
Corporate Bond Yields
The basic yields ofcorporate bonds were derived from themarket
prices of an extensive list of highgrade bonds, including virtuallyall the high grade issuestraded oti the New York StockExchange and the
New York Curb Exchange,as well as an appreciablerepresentation of the high grade issuestraded exclusively inover-the-counter markets and on out-of-towncxchaiiges. The original listof high grade bonds
was compiled from the records ofthe Corporate BondProject. This list has been keptcurrent and has been supl)lemefltedthrough reviews
of the records of highgra(ie bond offerings and of bondslisted on the
exchanges. Some small, inactiveissues may have beenomitted uninten- tionally, but theyare of little uriportance in thisstudy because of the
uncertainty and unreliabilityof theirrice quotations. Other issues
were deliberately omit ted becauseof convertibilityprovisions, active sinking funds,or other special features that undulyinfluenced the yield. Although anotherbond provision, the call feature,has had acon-
siderable effect upon bond yields,particularly (luring the few years,
callable bonds as agroup were not excluded from thesample. Foi- the
rears 1900-1933, bonds actually sellingabove call pricewere excluded, but for the years1934-47, this practice wasnot feasible because in this
later period so many of thehigh grade bondswere selling above call
price. Since the expectation ofearly call tends to keepthe price down and the yield up, the basic yieldsare subject to an upward biasin such
& See, for example, Trea5urv Bulletin.
6 Since the 1942 study,p. 8II., givescomplete (lescription of the niethodliv which the basic iehk are determined and the yiel(l-mattiritvstriictu,-e is Constructed oik-.1brief outline of the luetilOd is presented here.
See footnote I.
4years asi9qand ifD,when nu)st high gTa(le bonds were selling above
(all f)ri('e. 1-lowever, the basic yield is less affected by this bias than a
general average ol bond yields because the basic yield is (Icterimned
from the lowest, yielding b()fl(1S.
For eadi boiid analyzed an average jwice for the first quarter of the
year was computed fromthe high and low prices in January, February,
and March, and from this average price thc yield to maturity was corn-
pittel. Each bond was then plotted as one point on a scatter chart, on
which the horizontal axis rcprcsdntc(l years to maturity and the vertical
axis represented yield. The basic yield curve was then drawn freehand to
describe the relation between yield and maturity for the lowest yielding
bonds, which arcrcsitmai1ythe highest grade. The process is illus-
trated in Chart i,which shows the scatter (hagram and the basic yield
curve for corporate bonds for the first quarter of 1946. Ii will he noted
that an occasional bond yield lalls below the hued curve, whereas in
some maturity ranges the curve lies well below the lowest yields. It was
felt that a smoothingl)ro(esswas essential. Occasionally an isolated bond
yields less than all other bonds in the same maturity, and although we
were unable to attribute this directly to some clearly extraneous factor
there is always a chance that some such factor may have been at work.
Consequently, the basic yield curves were drawn through the lowest
points of concentration rather than the lowest individual yields. Since
many Illaturity ranges contain no points of concentration, some sort of
interpolation was necessary, and this was achieved by theUSCof smooth
curves.8All the basic curves in both the 1942 and the present stud\re1-c
drawn as simply as possible, and they all conform to one of four simple
types. In the 1942 study, covering the years i 900-1942, one of the fol-
lowing three types was found to give a satisfactory fit:(i) a horizontal
straight line, () a curve rising at a declining rate until it approaches a
horizontal straight line, or () a curve falling at a declining rate until
it approaches a horizontal straight line. In this study a lourth type is
found to give a better fit For the years 1944-47 - a curve rising ai the
short-tcrni end at a constant rate (a rising straight line), and then rising
at a declining rate until it approaches a horizontal line.
S Iii roost riwl ing these freehand curves. grea pa ins were takento iniake I hem smooth. This was
done by the process of dillercncing. .'t tiert tic piel inn nary curves were drawin, values along the
curves were tabulated and successive dillerences were obtained. Adjnistineniis of the curves were
made until the successive differences (sometimes second or lhir(l iltifereinucs were aiia1viedbec-anie
sufficiently regular.
It is rc'aIi7c(t that thIs process way have resulted in Os cc-suioot lung. However, t Inc alternative
was to fit the curves to the lowest ol,scrvcd yields inn ca Ii maturity range. and it was I cit thatI he
cirocs of uisder-smoouli big 1w this method were mole serious thain tlnmt' oF over-sninol lung.
For hurtlier discussiuni of this l)r01)lenn see Dnnranid, 'i/n. cii.. pp. 10.12.
5CHART 1- Distribution of High Grade Corporate Bonds by Yield and Termto Maturity,
and Basic Yie'd Curve, First Quarter, 1946
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State and MunicipalBond }ield.c
In principle the basicmunicipal bond yield isanalogous to the basic corporate yield, being definedas the yield of the highestgrade muni- cipal bonds free fromextraneous influences, or the lowestlimit actually
attained by municipal boiidsof a given maturity.In practice, however, the process of fittingthe basic municipalcurves has (liufered somewhat
from that used for thecorporates.
The pre'aIence ofserial issues in themunicipal market offerssome great advantages for research.While thecorporate analysis necessarily had to cover the bondsof a large number ofobligors, the municipal analysis could be limitedto a small number ofobligors with highest credit. In fact, NewYork State obligations,which have highcredit standing, Constitutea large proportion of the totalanalyzed in deter- mining the basic yields.These bondsare fairly actively traded,are out- stan(lirlg in large volume,and cover a completerange of maturities from a few monthsto 45 years. Bitt the analysiswas not limited to New York State issues; bondsof other obligors- those of California, Con-
necticut, MassachusettsMissouri, New Jersey,Pennsylvania, Balti- more, New York City, and Bostonwerealso included. Whilethe basic yield curves thus derivedmight almost beregarded as New YorkState yield-maturity curves becauseof the prevalenceof New York State bonds, they are believedto be reasonably comparablewith the basiccor- porate yield curves.































0CHART 2 -Distributionof HighGrade MunicipalBonds by Yield and Terni to Maturity,
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For the years 1943-47 a basic yield curve was drawn for each of the
three months, January, February, and March, based on quotations
taken from the Blue List ofCurrent MuiiicipalOfJeriugs, for the
middle Tuesday in each month.'° Values taken from these three curves
were averaged to obtain a basic yield curve for the (1uartCr. For i
the curves drawn for each month of the first quarter were identical,
and this was also true fori 945; for 194.4.i q46, and 1947 the monthly
curves differed slightly. Chart2shows the distribution of bond yields
for February16,1943 and the basic yield curve, which is identical with
that derived for January and for March of that year."
In the analysis of municipal bond yields, the coupon rate of interest
was an important factor. Investors apl)arently Ol)ject to paying high pre-
miums, with the result that low coupon bonds selling near iar are pie-
ferred to, and yield less than, high coupon bonds of the same quality
and maturity. In some years, the spread in yield for long-term New
York State bonds is as much as.50percent, and a large share of this is
attributable to coupon differences. The j)raCUCC of fitting the basi
1Since inttnkipal buTI(I, arc not traded nit the ouant,cd cshaitcs to:iiRextent. pm e rcwuls of
actual sales are dithcult to obtain. 1'Fie Blue 1.1st furnishes prices on an offered itasis oul-. ,vl,ich
may be slightly higher than the reali,ed price, but the (liffelCilICIS SOsmall that it has little,f any,
effect upon the computed basicicid. Moreover, The B/tie list has the great merit of giving quota-
tions on individual maturities of serial issues, which, are most desirable for the anabsis of a market
composed mainly of serials.
I The basicield estimates of nitiniripal obligations for the period l92i--I2. thiscusscil in Chapter 5.
are based omi over-tite-counter quotations from The Ban!: ond Onolutiot, Record. For selected ma-
turities monthly closing bid and ask quotations in Jaiiiary. February, and March were avcraged.








0yield CurVe to the lowesi yieldin each Inaulrity cussmeans iliati he
curve was hued to the low coupon bonds. Ibiswill be oI)Scrvcd in Chart
2,where the basic yieldcurve has been hued to a Icw scattered bonds
with low Coupons, althoughtheic is ahutchmorepl'OhlOt!fl(edcluster-
ing of high coupon bonds aboutv percent higher. ( onseqticiitly, the
basic iliunicipal bondyiCl(lSJmuist he interpreted as the yields of high
grade bonds with lowCOUpons.
The relationsfu1) betwcnyield and (oupoiiIittcis hOt PUliar to
the municipal market,although it is particularlypronounced in that
market. Ireasury bonds havea rather small variation in thecoupon
rate and hence a small variation inyield. Corporate bonds havecon-
siderable Varialion incoupon rates, but he attendantvariation in yield
is very difficultto analyze because the yield differentialbetween bonds
iiiav be due to quality, (all proviSions,and other factorsas well as the
coupon rate. But iii the ifltiiiicipalmarket- where one obligor may
have outstandinga number01noncaliablc bonds of thesame maturity,
presumably of thesame qualit,and with widely differentcoupon rates
- the effect of coupon upon siehl is suscc1)LibiCto analysis.12
lreasury Bond I ,elds
The basic Treasury bondyield is analogousto the basic corporate aiid
the basic municipal bondyields, yet it (lilfers fromthem in three very
important respects. In the first place,the use of the word "basic"
is in a sense redundantbecause there isnoqualitydifferentiation
among ireasury bonds. 'I'hus,to all intents andpurposes, the basic
yields may properly be calledaverage Freasury bond yieldsor simply
I'reasury bond yields. Iii thesecond placc, notone but two basic yield
curves had to be computed for this marketfori because the market is broken intotwo distinct segments. Oneconsists of taxable
issues; the other includesthose that are partiallytax-exempt.1This
division did not exist priorto l)e:einber i(4O,when tile taxable issues
were introduced into 'l'reasimry offerings;by Decemberi,i q4t they
comprised more than 85percent of the marketable Treasurybonds out-
standing. Finally, the basic 'i'reasuryyields were (lcrivcd solelyfroni the
analysis of negotiable securities,by which wemean all marketable secu-
rities regardless of eligibilityfor bank investnlent.In the middle of the
first quarter of 1946 thenegotiable issuesconstituted approximately72 percent of the United Statesgovernment debt. Thenonnegotiabic Treasury issues- such as Series E, F, and Ghave yields and yield
curves sharply divergent from those ofthe negotiable bonds.Only the
12 For fj ittier ttjsci,sçjoii ofI Ji is point, see Ad(teiOt 1111.
laSescial issues of whotiv tax-exemptSO tililies are otrIcIan(Iilir huther :ue iiorIliaiidjui, iii suufhirjent uiIlflSt,er (I) Serve as the I)aSis101 a vieItI-matuuiilv nil_ye.
SI
yields of negotiable 'Freasury issues arc fully COiflf )arablc with theields
of corporate and municipal securities.
The Treasury bond yield curves, which arc familiar because of their
use by the Treasury l)epartmncnt'4 are based uponbond priCeS and
yields oii S1)CCifiC dates; they are not exactly comparable to the basic
corporate bond curves. Iherciore, for the })ICSCtlI study, a new setof
Treasury bond yield curves has been computed to show the average
yield for the first quarter of each year, 1943-47. This average is derived
from the high price and the low price of issues in each of thethree
months of every quarter.
The Basic Field andtheConcept of Pure interest
While the basic yield represents an empirical approxiuiauon of arela-
tively riskiess rate of return on investineni and may therefore belikened
to the pure rate of interest of economic theory,certain fundamental
differences should be noted. The pure interest rate, whichhas never
been unambiguously defined, includes two primary features -riskless-
ness and uniqueness. Risklessncssimplies absolute safety and certainty
of principal and interest, including freedom from losses occaSiOflC(lby
changes in the general pre level, interest rates, and tax rates. Conse-
(juently, an essential prerequisite of riskiessness is the perfectforesight
of investors. Uniqueness implies a single fundamental rateunderlying
the entire structure of interest rates. 'l'his necessarily rests upoflthe
assuniption that all investors havecomplete lreC(lom of investment
action; that is, arbitrage transactions will beunhampered by legal re-
strictions, institutional investment practices, brokerage fees, costof in-
vestment analysis and administration,size of bond issue, or any of the
other barriers that hinder the flow of investment funds. Inthis ideal
market, all sections would be directly related, and an investmentin one
section of the market would yield as much as an investmentin any other
section, after adjustment lor costs and losses. Thusthe entire interest
rate structure would be based on asingle rate -- probably the discount
rate on riskless short-terni notes -and all other rates would be built up
from this. The long-term rate onprime obligations would be an aver-
age o the futureriskiess short-term rates, and the rate for any but top
quality bonds would be divisible illt() twodistinct j)arls - the rate for
riskless obligations of the same termand a premium to cover the risk
of default.
The basic yield, however, implies neither risklessness norunique-
ness. Although it is derivedfrom the yields of the bonds that by current
market appraisal are considered to be of the highestquality, these bonds
14Siiice the yield curves arc published currently in theTreasur B,i1IeIi,.the81C 1101 tC1)I0(i(ICC(l
here.
9are not entirely riskiess,iior are they so considered by investors. Fhe
basic yield reflectsthe markei 's somewhatuncertain evaluation of the
risk of default, howcvsitiall, plus the additional risksresulting from
changes inprices, interest rates, taxes,etc.
Obviously, the basic yieldis not unique. Investors(10 not COlfll)riSC a
homogeneousgroup, but are divided intomany groups of widely vary- ing characterBorrowers likewise,arc not a hotiiogeneous group, and
the securities theyissue differ inmany respects. As indicated above,
most bonds available forinvestment in the Americanbond market fall into three broadcategories each of which has(liStiliguishing character- istics: domesticcorporation bonds, Treasury bonds,and municipal
bonds. This gives riseto three related yet distinctinvestment markets, in which the basicyield curves differ Shar1)Iy.While arbitrage between
the markets exists, itis hampered bymany barriers, and, conse(Juefltly,
the etnpiricall)1 derivedyields in these marketsdo not reflect the mutt-
cnce 0 identical investment forces.11
15 An explanation of theterm structure of interest rates interms of the institllliotial frainetcorl. within which investment decisionsare made has been developed by W.Btaddock Hickman iii his study, The Term Structure ofInterest Rates. An understandingof the braid marketas consistingf more or less distinct Segments isOne facet of this institutional theory.
I 0THE PATTERN OF BASIC YIELDS, 1943-47
Charts and Tables of the Basic Yield
TILE pattern of basic yields for the lirsi (1llarter of each year, 194S-47, is
given in Chart.The chart contains four or more yield-maturity curves
for each year: one for corporate bonds, one for taxable Treasury bonds,
one for partially tax-exempt I'reasury bonds,and one for municipal
bonds. The taxable Treasury curve breaks (lown into two distinct parts,
one for short-term, bank-eligible issues and one forlong-term, bank-
ineligible issues. For i 946 there arc two basic nniiucipal curves, One
based largely on New York State issues and comparable to the curves for
the other years, the other based entirely on Massachusetts i percent
issues; thus the i 946 experience includessix distinct basic yield curves.1
Chart 3 also shows the pattern of yields for ion a logarithmic yield
scale. This chart, which pointspeicentage differences rather than
absolute differences, makes the basic yield curves more nearlyparallel,
but not entirely so.
Table t gives the values of these various curves for selectedmaturi-
ties. Values for interme(liatc maturities can be interpolatedfrom the
table or read directly from the charts.Fhc values in the table are
quoted to the nearest .oi percent, although they arepresumably subject
to a larger error. For the long-termyields the margin of error may be
about .05 percent, and in sonic instances this might be ashigh as .1
cent. For the short-term yieldsthe error may be somewhat larger - Per-
haps .2 percent.2
For all bye years the pattern of basic yields issubstantially the same.
In every year each yield curve has the samegeneral shape - short-terms
yielding less than long. Furtheintore, the differentyield curves always
bear the same general relationship to one another,although the general
levels of the curves and the differences betweenthem vary considerably
from yeai to year. The corporate yields are highestand are followed in
order by those of taxable Treasury bonds,the partially tax-exempt
Treasury bonds, and the municipals. The differencesbetween the cor-
I Si lice the \lilSwl(hl tiscttS 1 percent 1)Oflds were not art ively traded in 1917 a similar curve could not
lit' cOnIpIItC(l.
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14:ISJC \'IELI1S BY TERM TO MA'IIJRITL'Y,FIRS]' QLJAR'1'ER, I91347'
14
'The values in ilik table are takenat various iiiteivals along a smoothclove: intermediate values can be interpolated.
I. Based entirely on Ipercent coupon bonds.
Based on yields to lila) un ty a tid ternis to lila) ulil V.
1 Based iiii(ellis '.uiitl tenitis to earliest (all (late lot(al lal)IC l)Ofl(IS selling above par.
' l')iese estimates niav entailisiore t han thnorutal al000lit of eliot- hci mISC of lalk of a(IC(1(IflIe data in these maturity ranges.
- Based on bondS lot eligible for commercial latikinvestment.
porate curve and the taxable Treasurycurve arc usually sivafl. In1944,
for example, the differencewas only. ipercent for long-term bonds.
Although the differencewas largci- in the other'cars studied, it was
always small compared withthe difference between'Ircasury bOndS and
municipals. In 1946, for example,20-year corporates yielded2.35 per-
cent; 20-year Treasury bonds yielded2.19 percent; and20-year Irnini- cipals yielded1.00 percent.
Differences Between the Curves
The differences in the levels0 the various basic yieldcurves are at In- butable to the joint influenceof a number of forces,for eachcurve rep.
Fears 1943 1944 19.15 1946 1917 79431944 19451916 19461
(Mass.)
1917
(:oipora te Boudse ?%Iurzicipal Bondso
1
2
1.17 L08 1.02 .86'105' .43 .33 .29 .36 .36 .56
3
1.33 l.2tY1.15 .97 1.22 .52 .40' .33 .42 .40 .62
4




1.43'1.40 1.20 1.52 .67 .53 II .52 .48 .72
6




1.70 1.66 1.43 1.77 .80 .63 .48 .60 .55 .80
10
































































































































































































214j---resents a distinct (lass of securities possessing several distinguishing fea-
tures.1'he corporate market is characterized by fully taxable issues,
most of which are callable; maturities range up to about forty years, and
occasionally much longer. The municipal market is characterized by
tax-exempt. issues, most of which arc noncallable; maturities, which arc
usually serial, range to about forty years, rarely longer. M unicipals more-
over, are of special interesi to commercial banks, which may operate as
dealers in these securities. Finally, the Treasury market is characterized
by a number of different kinds of securities, varying in tax status and
ci igibility for corn mercial bank investment, which necessitates the con-
struction of more than one basic yield curve. For the years i three
curves arc required, as indicated above: a long-term, taxable, bank-
ineligible curve; a short-term, taxable, bank-eligible curve; and a par-
tially tax-exempt, bank-eligible curve. (A curve for the fully tax-exempt
bonds is not practicable because of the small number of such bonds
outstanding.) Treasury bonds are either noncallable or are callable a
few years prior to maturity. Maturities at the present time range up to
about twenty-five years.
In addition to these characteristic differences between markets, some
minor quahiy differentials may still exist even though each basic yield
curve represents the highest grade of bonds in its respective market.
Treasury bonds, for example, are probably a little more highly regarded
than either the best corporates or the best rnunicipals. There may also
be a small quality differentjal between the inunicipals and the corpo-
rates.
Tax status is probably the most important single factor coiiti-ibuung
to the differences in levels of the basic yield curves. For example, the
rather spectactilar difference, noted in all years, between the taxable
Treasury bond yields and the tax-exempt municipal yiel(1S is largely
attributable to the tax privilege, although there are other factois that
may have contributed to this difference, including desire for cliversifica-
tion on ihe part of investors, and the demand-supply situation in
Treasuries as compared with municipals. Although the reason for the
preferred position of tax-exempt bonds is easy to understand, it is dill-
cult to explain the amount of the difference. If all incomes were taxed
at a hxe(l rate, the differences between fully taxable bond yields and
tax-exempt yields should be almost exactly determinable. With a 35
percent general tax rate, lot- example, tax-exempt bonds should yield
65 percent as much as fully taxable bonds, so that the return to the in-
\restor after taxes would be the same. But actually income tax rates vary
Prior to 1938 many corpruate bonds were issuedvitli a provision that a 2 v'" income tax
would he pain hr the obligor. A few of these are still outstanding. hut the ellen t of this tax exenip.
lion is of minor importance.
15widely. Forindividuals the1916 rates ranged troiiitcro on IIICOHICS of less than $500to about 90C1'(Cfl t on incomes iiiexcess ol S2oo,000. CorporateinComeS, includitig those ofcommercial banks andliOflhinau cial corporations,during 1946were subject to federal jIICOIHCtax rates up to 38 percent,4 butduring the periodof Wartimeexcess profits taxes the upper limit wasconsi(Ieral)l\ higher. Thelnvcstnlent incomes ofmany Security holders,such as life insuranceCompanies, mutual savingsiii- StltUtjOflS, anduniversities aretaX-eXclupt or are subjectto only a very nominal tax rate.
Clearly, theattra(:[j\'eiicss of thetaX-exeniption privilege\'aries con- siderably frominvestor to invest01-. Withthe yield oftop grade mimi- cipal bonds fori 94-47 approxitnalcl}.one-half that oftaxable Treasury bon(1s,investors in the lowertax bracketscannot find the tax advan- [ages of high gradelnuluicipals veryattractive Coinniei-cjaI banks,even those subject in1946 to the nlaxiiiiurn corporateincome tax Fate of 38 percent, could hardlyhave effecte(jany great tax savingsby buying high grade flhttliiCiJ)alson the l)asis of the1 1)46 yield (hifferentials.5At the preseu level of taxrates and yield(lifferentials the chiefbeneficjai-ies of thet:tx-exeni1)tiOfl featureare individuals in thehigher income brack,-ts On thebasis ofi 946 tax rates, benefitscould be realizedby those withtaxable incomes inexcess of S20,00o (taxedat the rate of percent or moreon the excessover $2o.000).
But interest inmunicipal bonds isnot limited to thissmall group of high incomeindividuals Lowei-grade municipalswith higheryields may have positivetax advantagesto some investorswho do not findthe yields of [lietop grade bon(lsattractive Comn,iierci,1banks, whicharc Permitted to actas dealers inmunicipals, may deriveconsiderable profit from tradingpositions as distinct frominvestment positions.Further- more, they mayinvest in local municipalbonds asa formof(oI11munjt service or publicrelations Finally,Sonic investors whoWould HOt 1111(1 the taxadvantage inaiiy one year asufficient attractionmay be moti- vated to buylong-termmunicipal bondsbecause ofexpectedincreases in taxes.
The callprovision alsomay colitribtiteto the (hiffcren(esin levels between basicyield curves,although the effectis certainlyless pro- nounced than that ofthe taxprovision Sincemost in unicipal bondsare noncallable, theyprotect the Purchaseragainst a Possiblefall in interest rates. In this they(lifer materiallyIromii theCorporates. DuringPeriods of substantialdecline in interestrates, a Portfolio ofCoI'l)orates is a1tto 4 Coijoij011withtaxahile iIIcoins bctweS2oo() and SO.Of,(tthe O- aflcd'ilORhi i)Ia(ker
(OflS( It ute art excch)tiori.I Ire cxcs in er S25,JQo iIa xciitiI tie ol 55Ct ( ciii 1 8ajikwith(axal,Je itwotiles berweS25OOo arid 550.000 Id J)robahlvcc( t a in tu Iigi eater
avirrg. See footnotei.
'61
l)C partly li(1Uidateclasi result of calls, and reinvestment will almost
necessarily be at a lower rate. 'l'reasury bondsoccupy an intermediate
position for most of theni arc callable a fewyears before maturity. Com-
Pared with CorporateS and nuni icipals, long-tcrni Treasuriesare little
flU)FC than mcdium-tci-in bonds. :t this time (1947) the longest term
Ireasury 1)011(1 outstanding iiiaturcsiii 1972. 25 years hence, and it is
callal)le1111q67, 20 years hence. Nevertheless, these bonds offeran
assured yield to call for 20 years, and thus providea hedge against a fall
in long-term interest rates. An investor desiringan assured long-term
yield might well prefer one ol these bonds toa 40-year callable (oFl)0-
rate. The basic yield curves for both the inunicipals and (OrpOrateS are
based upon yield to niaturity. Ihis is entirelyappropriate for mum-
cipals, which will presulliai)ly be Paid at maturity.I bough less apl)ro-
priate for corpol-ates, ii is expedient because of the difficulty of predict-
ing if and when a corporate bond will be called. The basic Treasury
curves, however, arc based upon yield to the earliest call (late. The
assumption underlymg this procedure is that when 'I'reasury issues are
selling above par, as all of them were in the period studied, they will be
called at the earl jest opportunity.
The differences between the various basic yield curves oftenvary
with term to nialurity. For example, the difference between corporate
and Treasury yields is greatest for the very short maturities. An cx-
planation of this plietotueion can be found in the fundamental differ-
ences between the two short-term markets. The Treasury market --
consisting mainly of bills, certificates of indebtedness, and notes - is a
volume market in which the banks Lra(lc actively. This market, further-
more, has been supporte(l by the open market operations of the Federal
Reserve System. From Al)rilo.i 942, until July,i the Reserve
System operated under a stated policy of supporting bills at /8 j)ercent
and (luring much of this period, it was supporting certificates at7,/s
I)eicent. The corporate short-term market, on the (ontrarv. consists
mainly of former long-term bonds approaching maturity. The market is
not active, and there is no direct sul)l)ort from the Federal Reserve
Systcmn.
In the middle-term maturity range. the differences between theor-
porate curve and the 1 reasury curve have usually been small. The basic
corporate yields br 5- to 8-year bondsu ttmally fell below the yields of
Treasury securities in the first quarter obI 944, and they were oniv
slightly above the Treasury yields ini q4 and i In 1q46 and 1 947,
however, they were considerably above. This shift, it appears, is closely
tied up with the changing pattermi of demand by commercial banks for
Treasury bonds. Front lateithrough most ofi q5 new bank pLir-
chases in the 5-10 year class were relatively slight. Late ini how-
'7ever, and on an increasing scale (luringthe list (juarter ofi 9.f6 (and
also Subsequently) thel)anks (afliCin to make fairly significantnew purchases in the- to year class.
These small differencesin the earlieryears are difficult to explain. One pertinenl factor isthe volume of highgrade corporatc bondsin this range, which is smallin comparison with thevery large volume of Treasury bondsoutstanding. Moreover, thisshortage ofcorponites is aggravated by the habits ofsome inVestOrs, who holdtheir bondsto maturity regardless oftheir inai-kct yield.I'radingactivities in this sector are confined mainlyto Treasury securitiesand conse(fu(entlythe basic Treasuryyields arc piobablymuch more sensitiveto changes in demand than basiccorI)orate yields. l'or example,if yields of theac- tively traded issuesdecline or increase(luring the secondhalf of the month, and ifno sales of the inactivelytraded SSUCS take placeduring this period, onlythe former changein yield is relfccte(lin the basic yield.
The Shape of theBasicheldGurves
liic characteristicshape of the basicyieldcurves for Iq43-47, rising at the short-termend and levelingoff at the long-termend, has been typi- cal of the yieldmaturity relation in theAmerican moneymarkets ever since the middlethirties. Since theforces that determinethis general shape have beendiscussed extensivelyby marketanalysts, public oil- cials, andeconomic theorists,a systematictreatment of the question is not presented here. Al)riejstatement of the Principalcontributing forces is in order,however
On the practicalside, the low levelof short-termrates may be attri- bimied toa Preponderance of demandfor short-termsecurities relative to the supply, whichis the result of thevolume ofexcess reserves, the institutionalneeds of the comnfliercialbanks, and the0licies of the Fed- eral Reserve System.On the theoreticalside twoexplanations have been given for thepreponderance of demandfor short-ter111bonds relativeto the supply. Oneis that investorsdesire liquidityand willingly sacrifice yield in orderto obtain it; theytherefore bidup the prices of the short- term issues, relativeto the longer_teriui issues.The other isthat in- vestors attempt to discountexpected future changesin yields. Inso doing they bring abouta yieldn1aturit)curve in which the long-term yields arc anaverage of the expectedfuture short-termyields. Accord- ing to this secondview the risingcurve indicates thatinvestors must be expecting an increasein interest rates, and thatthey prefershort-term bonds nowso that later thc'can switch into long-tel-rnbonds onmore favorable terms.
A completerecoutciliatiomithese twoViews is possible if therele- s'ant forces areconceived as exertingdifferent influcn('eson Separategioups of investors. one group, [or exanl1)le - and this includes most o[
the banking systemdesires liquidity for its own sake, either because
of institutional requirements, custom, or considerations of safety. This
demand for liquidity may have no relation to any Conscious evaluation
of the future course of bond yields. A second group may expect a rise in
bond yields and anticipate this rise by buying short-terms .A third
group expects a fall and anticipates this fall by buying long-terms. And
finally a large fourth group, without any urgent need for liquidity and
with no strong convictions about future changes in interest rates,
attempts to obtain the highest possible current yield by a suitable ar-
rangement of maturities. As indicated above, another influence of pri-
mary importance is that exerted by federal agencies in the management
of the pullic (lebt. Therefore, the basic yield curve becomes a see-saw or
balance that tips one way or the other, depcn(hng upon the influence of
these various groups and the supply of securities of different maturities.
Thus the low short-term rate would be properly attributable to the in-
fluence of federal debt policy and to the combined weight of the first
two groups, those desiring liquidity and those anticipating a rise in
yields.
It is worth noting that the shape of the basic municipal yield curve
may be affected by the expectation of changes in tax rates, as well as by
the desire for liquidity or the expectation of changes in interest rates.
If income tax rates or investors' incomes were expected to rise dras-
tically, some investors would buy municipals to protect themselves, and
others would buy them as a speculation. For these purposes long-term
mumcij)als wouki be preferable to short, and a downward pressure
would be exerted on the long-term end of the municipal curve. This
pressure would tend to counter-balance the pressure onthe short-term
end exerted by the desire for liquidity or the expectation of a rise in
interest rates: consequently the expectation of higher tax rates would
ten(l to make the basic municipal curve flatter than either the taxable
Treasury or the corporate curves. Conversely, of course, an expected
fall in tax rates would tend to lift the long-term end of the municipal
curve.
I9THECHANGING PATTERNOF BASIC YIELDS,
1926-47
\V1IILE CHART3 gives a good j)iCtIlrc of thepattern of basicicids at a given timenamely, the firstq lartcr of each of theyearsi yearlymovements cannot bereadily detected fromit. Chartsand have beendesigned toOvercome this deficiency; theyshow the changes fromyear to year in thefirst-quarter basicyields ofcorporate and muni- cipal bonds of-vcar,0-year, and 30-yearmaturities, and also of Treas- ury bonds of3-year, 10-year, andlong--terni maturities.'
I.imjta/zonc of 1/a'Basic }ze/(fLS1j?)l(1/Cs
Fullrecognition o thelimnitatiomis of basicyields is essential inany analysis of thesecharts. In the firstplace, basic yieldsare better adapted to describing thegeneral pattern ofrates at a particuJai timethan the variation of ratesover time. A timeseries composed ofbasic; yields for the firstquarter of eachyear depicts thechanges in yieldsthat have occurred in thatquarter from yearto year, but itprovides no indica tion of thechanges thatmay have takeii p1aceduring the threeotIler quarters of theyears studied. Auexamination of otherinterest rate series, however,indicates that thetrend pi(;turecl bybasic yield data does not differ fromthat obtainedfrom these othermeasures The basic yield is alsosubject to thelimitation growingout of its derivation from the average ofthe high and lowprices of each month ofthe firstquam-ter, that theremay have beena few actual sales ofbonds during thequarter at yields slightly lowerthan the basicyield figure shown. In the secondp1ace, the estimatesof short- andlnediummtei-iu yields are subject toaim indeterminableerror, which may bequite large in some instances This isdue inpart to an occasionalinadequacy in the number of bonds forwhich dataarc available insonic particularma- turityrange, and in part to theuse of simpleCurves in fittinga basic yield curve. Theshoi-t- andmnediumntej-mmunicipal yieldsare some-
1There have nut beenally SO-%ear Treasury I)OudsolItstarl(IiIl,,since 1931. The longes(4erTreas- ury bond Outstanding inthe first quarter of1917 inatulrc(l iii 25cars and was caIlablin 21) 'ears. the longest-terni,)artiaIk Ia-C\CIiIj)Illc;iuiurv1)011(1uiiat iiied in as littleaIS 'caiatitiIt callaNe'Ii13 years.
20what less i cliable thancomparable corporate yields, anl iii turn the
corporate yields are somewhat less rclial)lc thanshort - and med itmin-
term Freasury bond yields. The long-term yieldestimates in all market
segments arc thought to be mooreaccurate than the short-tei'ni.
I'or the entire period covered bythis study there have beena large
number ol high grade municipaland col-I)orale bonds clustering in the
25- to 35-year maturity range. The estimated basic yield for3o-year
bonds has always been superiorto estimates of both the short-termand
the very long-term yields. lIowever,since the 30-year basic yields are
ordinarily estimated to thenearest .05 percent, and Since an error of
estimation 01: another .05 l)eCIlt is quite conccivable, the30-year basic
yields are not suflicientlyaccurate to show minor variations in yield of
02 to .03 !Ct. Comparable data foi1'rcasimry issues in this maturity
range arc lacking, but the long-term Treasury bonds l)ro\i(Iean accu-
rate meaSUre ot yields in the maturity classes for which such bondsare
available.
(;/iaiiges in the Pat(er,i oJ ThLS1C )ields
Although the basic yieldcurves changed considerably during the j)erio(l
under review, the tendency was for the relationshipamong the curves in
each segment of the niarket to be similarat aiiy one time (Chart 4). In
926 and 1927 the yield of short-term issues equaled that ol long-terms
in each of the three segments- Treasury, municipal, and corporate. In
1929 short-terms wci-e higher than long in all three segments; afl(l SIUCC
1933 yields of long-term issues have been the highest. However, when
the three segments arc comlsidere(l in 1-elation toone another, signihcant
differences are evident. Fromi q26 to m qqo, for exarnnle. the normal hier-
archy of yields seems to be (orporates highcst, mvnicipals next, Ireas-
ury bonds lowest (Chart 5). Rut during the thn-tics niuiiicipal yields
for all except the shortest maturities began to slip below those of
Treasury issues, and by i they were clearly lower.
]'he period from about i toi47 is marked by two (OflSl)1CUOI1S
developments: hrst, a fall in yiCl(IS, and second, a yield curve in which
short -tel-ill rates arc consistently below long-termrates.liifact, the
consistency of the low. short-termrate curve (luring the last5 years
has often led to the conclusion thatitis the normal curve form.
Ihis conclusion may be an accurate generalization of the p sent, but
it is certainly not an accurate generalization of the past. 'I'he low short-
term rate curve was not normal fi-om 1926 to 1930 according to Chart 4,
and it was not normal in the corporate market from 1900 to 1926.2
2 I)avid I)urand Basic Yields of Corporate Bonds. 1900-19 12 (Nat oiiaiIltitean of Economic Re-
search. I'cchnical Paper. June 19-12) Chart 3. p.tfl, aiid basic tttait,See .iso W. liraddock
H bkmaii -ihe Term Sirueture of Interest Iates, An I-Jslore:Iorv .-Inais,sNat (nulltitti ca ii of
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4'lie period932-47 (li\'ides itself 11110 three 01W iroiiiI2 tO
194!, when the lall in basicyields was abrupt and wideS1)rca(lt lie see-
011(1 IIOIIII tH' jb, when the downwatd telidelicywas not pro-
flOLIflce(l lii all Scctot-s ofthe market;a thir(l in 1947, when basic yields
increased for all maturitiesand all niarkct segments. (Sec Chart.) Betweeii i92 and ti shon-term basic yields declinedmore Sharp- ly tIlali long-terni
;furthermore, the decline in basicshort-tcrni bond yiei(IS relativeto long-term yieldswas greater in the Treasury bond
market than in tile othermarket segments. Thiswas due, in part, to the
Conversion privileges whicharose through the Treasury I)Oiic)' Ofper- lnitting the holderto exchange maturing Treasuryobligations for new issues on al)l'efcrclltial basis. Thisprivilege, in fact, was equivalentto the payment ofa premium on the bondat Inatul-ity although the value of thisl)renhilImlI could IlOt be predictedexactly. In a(ldition, tiìegrow- 'mg excessreserves of the (Olilmercial bankingSystem gave riSe toall
increase 111 (leniand for short-termTreasury obligations whichwas Illore thanproportionate to the increin demand for short-termobligations in other Segments of themarket.
After the sharp andconslstent declines from1992 to194!. the basic yield series followedno consistent tendency throughoutthe second period, 194 1-46. Someof the basic yield seriesactually rose,Some ye- inajned relatively stable,and others fell (Charts4 and 5). Medium- and short-termcorporate yields were higherthroughout most of thef)eliool than theywere in 1940. Short-termTreasury yieldsrose sharply from 1 940 to 1943 and 1944, largelybecause of tile volumeof new short-ict-in financing and thediscnnt !uIancc of thecon version privilege, amid then fell off somewhat.Long-tei-nicorporate yields moved (lownwardvery slowly withno suggestion of an interim rise.The only evidence ofa cOntinuation of the downwardtrend, whichwas so persistent in the earlier years. isin the municipal marketand the Partiallytax-exempt Ureasury market, wherethe tax-exemptionprivilege exerteda strong downward pressure (lul-ingthe period of highwar taxes. Long- and
inedium_tei-,ii bond yields inboth these marketsnmovc(l rather sharply (loWUward aftera slight rise aroitnd1942-43.
In contrast to the behaviorin the preceding periods, basicyields in- creased in all maturityclasses and in allmarket scglnents ini q7. ,-1 short- and mediuni-terniyields rosemore rapidly than the longer-tel-Ill yields. These relativelylarger increasesin the short-term yieldsweic clue, in part, to the Treasurypolicy of retiringpalt of the Federal debt. The issues retiredwere those which were largelyowned by the Federal Reserve banks and thecommercial banks. Tile effectsof this policy
upon bank reserves and bank demandfor securities in tileshorter-terill market segmentsmore than collnterbaiaiiccd [liereduction in tilesup-
24iiiy ofsiiort-tcriii Ircasurv SecuritieS. 111 a(ldition. tile growilig tincer-
tainty in ihe niinds of inan' investors about the continuance Or CXI Cii-
sion ot the wartime interest rate policies followed by the ircasury and
the Federal Reserve banks, pan icularly those apj)licai)IC to thC short-
terni yickls, retarded the tendency ol the investors iii the short er-term
issues to exten(l the maturity of their holdings.
Basic Yields versus Low GradeBO1l(l hells
ihe lack of a CoilSiSteIlt downward trend in basic yields from i 94() to
1946 will stand Out in sharp contrast to the experience of many ill-
vestors, who found that both 1)011(1 yields in their port folios and interest
itICOInC (leclined consideralily during the j)CriOd. illiS apparelit contra-
(lid ion is readily cx1)lained, however, by the prevalence of corporate
refimdings and by the fall in yields on low grade bonds.
Ihe general ilul)rovelncnt ln crcdjt standings of most companies,
the wartime policies ui stabilizing yields of 1'rcasury obligations, and
other fiscal policies of the governmnCilt were conducive to \'ery extensive
bond ref unding operations. The vohumne of corporate refundings from
anuary i,m q4o to 1)ecemnber m,iis estimated to have been in
excess 0 $mo.billion; rcliundings were particularly heavy ill1944,
i q45, and the first halt of i q46.IlleSe refundings iflVOlVe(l a substaii-
tial rc(luction in coupon rates of interest. High coupon bonds matured,
were called prior to maturity, or were evenbought up in the open mar-
ket; and they were replaced by new low coupon issues or low-ratebank
loans. With the rediiction iii rommnon rates tame an effective reduction
in interesi costs to borrowers and ininterest ilicolIle to l)ofldlhOl(lerS,
both of which were entirely compatible with a stable level ofbasic cor-
porate yields. Evidently these refunding operations were aprocess of
colTcctiOfl to bring tile COtll)Ofl rates ot interest intoline with the basic
viCl(IS. }roin 1933 to940 bond prices rose sharply with anattendant
Fall in market yields. There were some refundings to lower coupon
rates, but because of the continuOuS(ledline in basic yields, on tile
whole, coupon rates relnainc(l well above l)asic yields. ButillI 940, after
the lall in basic yields had spent itself, refundings began tobring cou-
pon rates down into linewith market yields. For many investors tile
decline in market yields meant very little, a long astheir portfolios re-
mained inta(;t and their interest income continued asbefore. They
began to be aware of the trend only when therefunding of bonds
bought in tile (lays of higher yields began to cut downtheir income.
As indicate(l. one of tile factors contributing to thelarge volume of
corporate ref inidings since Iwas the growth in business confidence
3 Federal Jecrn'e liulhti,iuilv 1916.72.and theiuiproveflleffl in the lilialicialposii ion ot mostcorporate(11) ligors.l'licse (LCVCIopnleiitsalsoCVidence(! themselvesin a cIet hue iii the 'ields Of lowergi-acle boiids. ilustendency is clearly shownin Chart 6, which tracesthe IIIOVCIUCIit01\1001's :aa anol Baabond yields




1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
1946 1947
from i 938-47.Further Cvideiiccol this tendencyis given by thechange yield depth thatoccurredillIhe(:orpol-atc market fromI940 to 1946. This change in(1C1)thl isSliO)Wi1in Charts7, 8, and g whichl)resem the yield distribtitiomiof corporatebonds of allgiades in selectedma- turity ranges in thehrst quarter of1940,I946, aiI(1 1947. In(lie colistuic- tion of these chartsa tally was first madeof short-term11bond yields,rep- resented l)y I- to5-year fliatum-itics:lliediuiiiter,ii bondyields, 8 toI 4 years; and long-term bondyields,24to30years. '['he Inaturity ranges had to be madefairly broad inorder to includean adequate numberof bonds. In makingthis tally thediffercntit1 betweenthe actual yieldto maturity of each bondamid the basic yieldfor bonds of likeiiiai urity was taken, amid the bondswere gTotuped iii yieldclasses accordingto thisTABLE2
CHANGES IN CORPORA'I'E BONI) YIELI)S, 1940-47
differential: o to .tq percent above the basic yield,.20tO .Q percent
above the basic yield, etc.4
An examination of Charts 7, 8, andindicates a considerable de-
crease in the dispersion, or depth, of bond yields between 1940 and
i 946 for each of the selected maturity groups. The lower grade bonds
declined in yield more rapidly than the higher grade, and the yields on
all bonds tended to concentrate in. a narrowing range above the basic
yield. This tendency is sharply evident when an examination is ma(IC of
the changes for three maturity groups from 1940 to 1946 in the basic
yield, the yield on the bond at the first quartile, the yield on the median
bond, and the yield on the bond at the third quartile as shown in Table
2.In i47 the basic yield rose while the third quartile bond yields for
all three maturity groups fell. In other words the yield depth continued
to decrease in the first quarter of ieven though basic yields moved
4 ilie distribution of 1910 bonds was obtained from the records of the Corporate hood Rescan I,
Project, which include all acleqtiatclv quoted issues of5,000,00O or more, and a 10 percent sample
of smaller issues. The (listribtition of 19-16 and 1947 bonds was made from Fitch's bond record for
the month of February in each year. Distributions of l)ond yields, by iiidustrv groups, are being
piepared under the Corporate Bond Research l'rojeet for the entire period 1900-1916. Iii making
these dtstrihutions the following types of bonds were omitted: serials, income bonds, bonds sif

















(mid-point value: ½ years)
1940 1.00 1.80 1.25 9.00
19-16 1.15 1.73 2.97 4.25
Net Change +15 -.07 -1.28 -4.75
19-17 1.45 2.12 3.06 3.98
Net Change over 1916 -f-.30 +9 + 09 - .27
\ls-cl urn-term Boiids:8-I-! Ycais
(mid-point value:II 4 years)
1940 2.10 3.90 5.13 9.30
1946 2.05 2.92 3.89 4.61
Net Change -.05 -.98 -1.54 --IA3fi
19-17 2.17 3.00 3.80 4.63
Net (:haiige over l9!6 +12 +08 - itO - .01
Long-teins Bonds: 24-30 Years
(mid .point value: 27 i'2ears)
1940 2.70 3.03 3.15 439
1916 2.10 2.55 2.71 2.97
Net Change -.30 -.18 -.71 -1.12
1917 2.50 2.60 2.73 3.01
Net Change over 1916 -(-.10 -.01 - .04CHART 7-Frequency Distribution of 1-5Year Corporate Bondsby Yield Differentials, FirstQuarter, 1940, 1946, and1947*
Percent of nU bonds
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Difference betweer,bønd yield andbosit yield * Bonds with differencesof 7%r moretave been omittedfrom this chart.
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0CHART 9Frequency Distribution of 24-30 YearCorporate Bonds by Yield
Differentials, First Quarter, 1940, 1946, and 1947*
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Difference between bond yield and basic yield
* Bonds with differences of 7% or sore have been crnitted from this chart.tipwar(l, 'l'his evidence,however, is apparently111 COlIflict with thatgiven in Chart 6 whichshows that the(lifference betweenyields on Aaa and Baa I)(Jnclsincreased inI 947.
\Vith respectto this apparent differencein results itshould be noted, first, that 'JaNe2 and (Thart 6 arc not directlycomparable be- cause the lOI'iiler is basedon a count of individualbond yields,While the latter isan average of bond yieldsin a given ratinggrade. Furthej Illore, it iS not P°Siblcto determine whetherthere is a realconflict in results since the bondsrated Baa by Moody'scannot be identified in 1 able 2. Onepossiblea use of such a conflictis corporaterefundings, which might haveshifted the positionof Baa bonds inthe distribtitio, of all bonds.







0 05 1.0 15
A DDE ND U M
RELATION OF BASIC YIELI)S TO COUPON RATES
IN TUE DEVELOPMENT of the estimates of basic yields for municipal
bonds, a marked tendency was observed for yields to vary with coupon
rates. Although this tendency has been observed iii the corporate mar-
ket and in the United States government market, it is pmimiar11y a char-
acteristic of the municipal market, where noncallable bonds of the same
obligor are frequently found with similar maturities but wide!)' differ-
ing coupon rates. An illustration is given in Charts to and ii. Chart io,
for example, shows the coupon rates and yields in mid-February of
144 and ifor New York State bonds maturing between i 970 and
i79. Despite the small number of available quotations for this ma-
turity range, the association between yields and coupon rates is clearly
evident. These bonds are all noncahlable and presumably of uniform
quality, and although there may be some variation in yields attributable
to difference in maturity, this variation is nearly negligible in this lim-
ited maturity range. A better example is given in Chart. ii, which shows
CHART 0 - Relation Between Coupon Rate and Yield, New York State Bonds Maturing
1970-79, for Selected Dates, 1944-45
(curves fit ted by eye)
20 25
Coupon rate
30 35 40 4.5 5.0
31CHART 11Relation Between CouponRate and Yield, New York City Bondsand Coipo-
rate Stock Maturing 1970-75, for SelectedDates, 1945-46
(curves flfled by eye) Yitd
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the behavior ofNew York Citybonds an(lcorporate stock.1 Thesesecti- rities, thoughnot of quiteso high quality'as New York Stateissues, have good uniformcrC(lit Stall(liflgand arenoncallable.Moreover, theyare actively traded, andan adequate numberof quotationscan be found in the six-yearmaturityrange fromI t)7()to i SOthat the possibleeffects of variationin maturityare even furtherreduced. Two examplesof thes'iekl-couponrelationship forcorporate bonds arc given in Tablesand4. The hist of thesetraces the yieldsfor the period 1924to 1936 of threeLouisville andNashvill Railroadbonds issued underone iiiortgage andhaving thesame maturity.The second traces two UnionPacific bonds,also issuedunderone mortgage and having one maturity,from i924 tO 1937. Althoughthe tendencyis dear


















'4'I A B I.:3
iEBRU..1y YIELDS OF' LoEyIsvILLl.:AN!) NAS}IvlI,ij FIRS'!' AN!)
REFUNDING 1½'s, 5's AN!) S'sOF 2,003, J)2-I-36
(Yields coin pnted Jront average 0 highand low fli-U-es in February)
Average price was above call price of 107V.
Based on March prices because 5's did not sell in February.
for the high coupon bonds to yieldmore than the low coupon bonds,
these examples are less convincing than the New York State and New
York City examples because o the effects of the callprovision. The
Louisville and Nashville bonds were callable ati 02tO105,the Union
Pacific bonds at 107¼. And during the periods covered by the examples.
Aerage Pt ice was above call price. The 5V's were callableat 192 on or afict October 1, 193(3; the
5's at 105 on or after October I, 1958; and t he -1 V'sat 1(15 on or afici Otohei I ,1939.
'1' A Ill. t:
FEHRUARY YIELI)S OF UNION PACIFIC FIRST .-N1) REFUNDING
4's AN!) S's OF 2,003, 1924-37





1924 - 5.02 5.2!'
1925 1.85 4,87 5.16'
1926 1.59 4.78' 5.00'
1927 1.1$ 1.69' 5.07'
1928 -1.30 1.59 4.99'
1929 -liiO 1.83 5.21'
1930 4.69 4.79 5.16'
1951 1.49 4.78 5.19'
1952 (3.99 6.83 7.02
1935 (3.70 7.01 7.29
1934 1.96 5.15 5.40
1955 1.38 (.71' 5.18
1936 -1.13' (.54' 5.23'
r('n 1















1957 5.67' 4.14'tile highCOUI)Ol1 bends ol liotli railroadslrcqUCflity sold abovctheir call prices.
The relationshipbetween yield andcoupon is readily translated into a similar relationshipbetween yield andprice; highIwemiulli bonds, whichare normally highcoupon bonds, usually sellon a higher yield basis than lowpremium bonds. Thisis clearly illustratedin Charts
CHART 12 RelahonBetween Price and Yield,New York State BondsMaturing 1970-79, on February 16, 1944
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CHART 13 Relation
Between Price andYield, New YorkCity BondsMaturing 1970.75, on February 13,1946
(curve fitted byeye)
100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 Pricei 2 and i,presenting yields and iriccs oil Febuiarv i fi,i44 I or New
York State issues maturing Irom7u toi q7and on Februaryi
I q46 for New York City issues mawri ug from i qo toi ()7. the yield-
coupon relationships for these same bonds on these (lates were shown
on Charts i o and ii
All indications are that the fundamental causal relationship is be-
tween pi'and yield, rather than coupon and yield. Investors seem to
be price COflSCiOUS. They tend to prefer bonds selling at discount to
bonds selling around par, and the latter in turn to bonds selling at a
substantial prc mm. This price consciousness, which results in an ap-
preciable differential in yield, is attributable to a number of factors.
These may be grouped into four broad categories:(i) the possil)ihty
of redemption prior to maturity: (2) barriers to systematic ainorti/a-
tion of premiums; () expectations of changes in interest rates: () a
more or less irrational belief on the part of a few investors that low
priced bonds are bargains merely because they are low 1)riced.
In the corporate bond market the possibility of redemption prior
to maturity, a very common occurrence, is a real force affecting both
prices and yields of premium and discount bonds. Most corporate bonds
may be called prior to maturity, at the option of' the obligor,in accord-
ance with the provisions of the bond indenture. Corporates mayalso be
prepaid by court order in the course of a voluntary or involuntary re-
organization. In particular, utility holding company bonds may be pre-
paid in reorganizations ordered by the Securities and Exchange Coin-
mission in the administration of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act. In these reorganizations the relationship of the liquidationvalue
of the bond to the coupon rate has been one of the troublesomeprob-
leins confronting the administrative authorities.
The possibility of prepayment or(hnarily tends to enhancethe
attractiveness of low 1)riced bonds. A good example of this principleis
provided by the Union Pacific Li's and ,'s mentioned in Table 4.Over
the six-year periodi 932 toi 937 these bonds variedconsiderably in
price; ini q32 1)0th bonds wereselling at discount. and ini 936 and
1937 both were sellingabove the call price of 107¼. During these six
years the 5'S always yielded(in February) more than the 4's, which im-
plies that the 5'S were the more attractiveinvestment. But these yields
were computed on theassumption that the bonds would be held to
maturity and retired at 1)ar;whereas actually both bonds were retired!
on September 1, 1940 ati 07½. It is thereforeinstructive to examine
the yields to actual retirement over the same1)criod. (These are the
yields that w'ere realized by investors 'who boughtthe bonds in February
of each year and held them until Septemberi,i 940.) These yields,tabulated below,show that the 4'Sproducer! a helterrealizedreturn than the5S.
Although theretirement of thesebonds in1940 could not. havebeen precisely forecastin i 932,or even inp37, the 1)ossibility of suchan outcome was certainlysulhcicnt to givethe 4'S an elementof sI)eCulattve appeal in periodsof lowprices, and to renderthem less likelyto pro- duce a loss' l)eriocls of highprices.
While theprepayment of highgradecorporate bonds isa common OCCUITeIICC, thejwepayiiwn of high grademunicipal bonds israre in- deed. Mostinunicipalsare not subjectto call, and the possibilityo pre- by court orderis remote,especially for thehigher grade obligors. It istherefore unlikelythat theexpectation of1)repaylfleflt is siillicient toproduce anappreciable effecton the I)flCan(l yields of municipalissues.
Somewhat relatedto the possibilityol prepaynt is the possibility of artificialmarketsupport. The FederalReserve System, forexample, has the1)O\VCT to support theTreasury bondmarket by itsopen market operations. A feelingamong investors andmarket analyststhat the Re- serve System wouldattempt to supportthe marketat par in theevent of a rise in interestrates would providegrounds forpreferring lowcoupon Treasury bondssellingnear j)ar.










1937 3.49 3.37states, Such as Pennsylvania; and in states where it is permitted, trustees
often ptelcr to avoid ainoruzat ion because of the conflicting interests of
bencliciarics, or even because of the (lilliculues of explaining thej)tOCCSS
of amortization to an uninformed beneficiary. Finally, amortization
ordinarily involves a certain amount of troubleor expense, which may
in(luce many small investors without good knowledge of accounting
priiiciplcs tO prefer the simpler method of writing offprcini11ns. It is
evident, therefore, that strong legal and institutional forces iiicluce
many investors to seek lowiiium, low coupon bonds as the siiiiplesi
solution to their accounting problems. These forces, furthrinore, are
quite as relevant to the purchase of municipals as to the purchase of
corj)orates.
It is worth noting thai cross currents and counter forces are some-
times presetit. A trustee, for example, may be prohibited under the
terms of the trust from expenditure of capital, evemi to meet energen-
cies; and the purchase o a high I)remnii1n, high coupon bond may oiler
a legal loophole to circumvent the prohibition. Or again, security deal-
ers may derive a small advantage From high coupon, tax-exempt bonds.
Prior to the Revenue Act of i 1)42, almost any investor could derive an
advantage. Since amortization was not allowed, the investor could buy
a high premmutim muincipal, enjoy a tax-exempt COU1)Ofl income, and
then incur a cal)ital loss for tax itiiposes when the bond matured or was
sold. But alter i 942, the average investor was required to amortize his
premiums on tax-exempt bonds. 1)ealers in mnunicipals, however, arc
still permitted to de(luct pmn1m losses as long as they are merely
maintaining a trading position in the market.
Ii is widely recognized that short-tcrnm bomids arc nmre attractive if
interest rates are expected to rise and that long-term bonds arc more
attractive if interest rates arc expected to fall. It is not SO widely recog-
nizc(l that high COUOfl bofl(lS arc more attractive than low coupon
bon(ls of the same immaturity if rates are cxl)ccte(l to rise, and that low'
coupon bonds arc more attractive ii ii'itcmCst rates are expected to fall.
:11 illustration is given in lable ,which shows the prices of three
bonds with coupon rates of .and 5 percent when the rate of return
is 1,i /2. and 2 percent to maturity. The table also shows the percent-
age change in price that would follow from a fall in yields fromi ½ to
1 .0 percent and the change that would follow' from a rise in yields from
¼ to 2 percent. For example, the bond sells at Sim.m 7 to
yield i.I)erceflt to IllatLirityif the yield should fall to m .o percent the
price would rise to Sm 44. i 4, an increase of i 0.99 percent in the market
price. The table clearly shows a small but real advantage for tile low
coupon bond in a period of falling rates,for the capital gain on the i ½
percent i)Ond is greater than that Oil tile 3 l)ee11tbond, which is ill
37turn greater than thaton thcpCFCIII l)OI1(I.( onvei-sd, thc high cOupon bonds havea small hut real advantage ina period of rising rates. for the capitalloss is lesson these bonds.
TA8LF 5
F. R. Macaulayhas pointedout that a lowcoupon bond has a longer period of "duration"than a highCoupon bond of thesamematurity.3 Thereason is that a highcoupon bond sellsat a premium thatmust be amortized out ofinterest income andthis amortizationis in effecta repaywezit of principal.For c-xarn1)lea 5 Percent bond,4 years from maturity should sellat S2,00 1to yield1 .5 PelTent to maturity.When the bond is finallyrcdeduje(t371/2years later, almost exactlyone-half of the principalof theinvestmentwill have beenrepaid; only one-halfof the originalinvestmentremains invested forthe entireperiod. This transaction may beregarded eitheras an averageInvestment of about $1,500 for theentire 37years or, alternativel)as an investme,t ofthe entire S2,001 foran average periodof about 28years.4 In the1947 market,characfcrize(1 by lois'short-ten11rates, high coupon bonds shouldyield less thanlow couponbonds of thesame maturity because their"durationS' isshorter, butactually they yield more. Thiscontl-adictiofl isnot so real as itappears. Investorswho ex- pect a fall in interestrates will preferlong-term bondsin general,and long-term, lowcoupon bonds inParticular: those whoexpect interest rates to rise will prefershort-term bonds.Neithergroup will preferthe long-I ei-m. highCoupon boiids.
2itiutir ni- tJeljita rca ljIgivenin-%V. BrakI(,( k 11 ikiitrii The ire,,, StChef tire of In-
ter(-1 l?a/ec.-in E/Ior,toc v Ana/ysjç(Nui loris I11cr cau of 1-"rn,mIc Reea reh.mc. NOverlli,er 16. 1912) (lcaicici 3.1Ii(k1rni,ItIc5Lltii1i uc- Flr,ela,I1 of (oIipourSIcs to the profitsobIaiflahi
Inrtding thinterest CUt c'e'jhtj lug in,furrc.to IoIw-term lcoik111(1 scum., thembcf
he mat lime.
Fret let u k R. Mata cmlii.onn iliror, I u-ni Pi 'hh-,,1
-Ugt-c!,-1/byI/ic him 'i,;,-,,Is of hi/er cc! R/c Bond Yields and Stockl'rj(ec in I/jr(nhI(-(jSlates SiOce l$5(I(\lIjoliiI f Ect,n,iiiRe-
search, 1938)pp. 4-1-53.
4i hice aJpI ox imat ions to F lie as ciage cm 0)11111I nveste(I a ml thea vet age period 01 invest IncH t ate
c.xtIernejv roll gir. \ta(auIIa%dcs ribcs a hId iio Iof (Oflipti hug hcavc-F-;ige ditiii ion. huttire detaik i-c lint net essa rv for this.-malis.
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CHANGES IN IRJCEsANI)IELI)S TO MXI'URUFylOR 25-YEAR BONDS WITHCOUPON RATES OF 11/,,, ANI) 5 PERCENT
I'f-,cent C/,an',-illPrier
lI'Iien Yields P1.i( CIF/,e,i Field /i
i:,,(. 1.0% I . 1.3% 2.0% to
i:,,(. 1.0%
% SI 11.01 -SI 00.00 $ 90.20 ± Ii Ml'; 3 lI-Ill 131] 7 119.60 + l0.!t) 5 188.29 172.7-I 158.79 ±10.90
8.88.8As an explanation 01 the coupon-yield relationship, this analysis of
ex1)cctatlon and bond duration is not particularly conclusive. The im-
plications of the analysis are probablynot anderstood by enough in-
vestors with suflicient funds to affect the market appreciably. Further-
more, ihe possibility of gain fromapl)hicatlon of these principles is too
limited to warrant much attention fromany but the largest investors.
Although a low coupon bond does offer the l)eSt Opportunity for capital
gain in a period of falling interest rates, the relative advantage is small.
In 1 able 5 the capital gain (ii .04 percent) on the ipercent bond,
which results from a tall in yield from 1.5 to 1.0 percent, is very little
more than the gain for the 5 percCmt bond (10.90 percent).
The final reason suggested for the market's dislike for hihp'--
miunis was a more or less irrational prefereiice for low priced securities
merely because they are low pricc(l. This was not intended to iiip1y
that some investors choose low priced bonds without regard to their
intrinsic value, but rather that nianv investors make decisions based
l)a1ly on careful analysis and partly on whim or temperament. Even the
most astute and assiduous analyst cannot hope to be entirely rational or
completely informed. When a doul)t arises, will the low priced security
get the l)CflCfitIhe forces of investment psychology cannot be ignored.
Because of the many valid reasons that make low coupon bonds more
attractive under certain circumstances, investors may be led to believe
that they are more attractive under other circumstances. If an investor
rcalizcs that a low coupon corporate has a clear advantage because of
the possibility of repayment, is he not apt to conclude that a low coupon
municipal has at least a small advantage for the same reason?
The implications o the coupon-yield relationship to the basic yield
analysis and to interest theory in general should not be overlooked.
According to traditional theory any two bonds of different coupon rates
but alike in other respects, especially (1ualitv and maturity, should yield
the same return.5 In practice. however, this principle clearly does not
hold; l)onds selling nearare definitely preferred to those selling at a
high premium, and conse(Jucntiv they yield appreciably less. Therefore,
a realistic discussion of interest rates should specify sonicconsistent
treatment of coupons. Since the basic yields are computed from the
lowest yields of bonds actually traded in the market. they automatically
tend to reflect the lowest coupon bonds, which sell at the lowest pie-
miums. In the ideal analysis, the basic yields would becomputed en-
tirely fm-urn bonds wjth coupons just low enough to permit the bonds to
sell at approximately par. But over the l)ast fifteen years coupon rates
I'crhaps the mat uritv of high coupon bonds should be adjusted in accordance with Macaulay's
print iple of duration. The comparison wotIt(1 hen be between I,oiids having the same dur itiOli 1)111
different COUOfl rates.I
have not keptpace with the falliii bout! yields, and most of thehigh gTa(le issues, fromwhich the basic yieldsarcdCter,IljflC(J,have sold ata P''ill IlL
Sincecoupon rates have1101always keptpace with yields, thecon- 1)011-yield relatiolishif)introduces an additionalnote of lioncompar- ability into the basicyields for differentyears. Iii 1946, for example.a Special basic yieldcurve for i percent lULIliicipalbonds wasComputed, based on a singleissue of the Conlmnoiiwealthof Massachusetts. Butno corresponding i percent bondswere outstanding inprevious years, and therefore this specialMassachusetts curve docsnot seem properlycotti- parable with the basicyield curves for earlieryears, which were deter- mined from bondswith higherCoupons.
]he pi ohlem of bondsselling at a discoutit hasnot unite up in this anal sis.If itIteIet t alesever rise sIIl)StatifialIyso that high grade bondsate eIliitg at less titanpat, the untpoii. ield rehirionshi1) ma pr cscit 1 new problems lota ita lysis.
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